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Abstract
We consider the problem of diffusing information in networks that contain malicious nodes. We
assume that each normal node in the network has no knowledge of the network topology other than
an upper bound on the number of malicious nodes in its neighborhood. We introduce a topological
property known as r-robustness of a graph, and show that this property provides improved bounds on
tolerating malicious behavior, in comparison to traditional concepts such as connectivity and minimum
degree. We use this topological property to analyze the canonical problems of distributed consensus
and broadcast, and provide sufficient conditions for these operations to succeed. Finally, we provide a
construction for r-robust graphs and show that the common preferential-attachment model for scale-free
networks produces a robust graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
A core question in the study of large networks (both natural and engineered) is: how do the
actions of a small subset of the population affect the global behavior of the network? For instance,
the fields of sociology and epidemiology examine the spread of ideas, decisions and diseases
through populations of people, based on the patterns of contact between the individuals in the
population [1], [2], [3]. In this context, one can ask whether a few stubborn individuals (who
do not change their beliefs) are able to affect the decisions reached by the rest of the population
[4], [5]. Similarly, the efficacy of engineered networks (such as communication networks, or
multi-agent systems) is often predicated on their ability to disseminate information throughout
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the network [6], [7]. For example, the ‘broadcast’ operation is used as a building block for more
complex functions, allowing certain nodes to inform all other nodes of pertinent information [6].
Another important operation is that of ‘distributed consensus’, where every node in the network
has some information to share with the others, and the entire network must come to an agreement
on an appropriate function of that information [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].
The ability of a few individuals to affect the global behavior of the system is clearly a double-
edged sword. When the network contains legitimate leaders or experts, it is beneficial to ensure
that the innovations introduced by these small groups spread throughout the population. On the
other hand, networks that facilitate diffusion are also vulnerable to disruption by individuals that
are not acting with the best interests of the society in mind. In engineering applications, these
individuals could correspond to faulty or malicious nodes that do not follow preprogrammed
strategies due to malfunctions or attacks, respectively. Thus, a fundamental challenge is to
identify network properties and diffusion dynamics that allow legitimate information to propagate
throughout the network, while limiting the effects of illegitimate individuals and actions.
The problem of transmitting information over networks (and specifically, reaching consensus)
in the presence of faulty or malicious nodes has been studied extensively over the past several
decades (e.g., see [8], [6] and the references therein). It has been shown that if the connectivity of
the network is 2f or less for some nonnegative integer f , then f malicious nodes can conspire
to prevent some of the nodes from correctly receiving the information of other nodes in the
network. Conversely, when the network connectivity is 2f + 1 or higher, there are various
algorithms to allow reliable dissemination of information (under the wireless broadcasting model
of communication) [13], [14]. However, these methods require that all nodes have full knowledge
of the network topology, along with the specific parameters of the algorithm applied by all other
nodes. Furthermore, the computational overhead for these methods is generally quite high [8],
[13].
It is not surprising that there is a tradeoff between how much each node knows about the
overall network and the conditions required for those nodes to overcome malicious adversaries.
The objective of this paper is to analyze information dissemination strategies in networks with
adversaries when each normal node only has access to its neighbors’ values, and does not
know anything about the rest of the network (i.e., the topology, number of nodes, location
and behavior of malicious nodes, etc.); it only knows that the total number of adversaries in
its own neighborhood is bounded by some known quantity. We introduce the concept of r-
robust graphs, and show that such graphs provide resilience to malicious nodes. We focus on
the particular applications of fault-tolerant broadcast and distributed consensus, and similarly to
[15], we consider a locally bounded fault model where there is an upper bound on the number of
adversarial nodes in the neighborhood of any reliable node, but there is no other a priori bound
on the total number of adversaries in the network. In the case of fault-tolerant broadcast, our
conditions can be applied to show that broadcast will succeed in certain networks that do not
meet the conditions provided in [15]. For distributed consensus, our conditions provide separate
sufficient and necessary conditions for all normal nodes to reach consensus while limiting the
ability of locally-bounded malicious nodes to influence the final value.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network modeled by the directed graph G = {V, E}, where V = {1, ..., n} is the
set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V is the set of edges in the network. An edge (j, i) ∈ E indicates that
node i can be influenced by (or receive information from) node j. The set of neighbors of node
i is defined as Vi = {j | (j, i) ∈ E} and the degree of xi is denoted by degi =|Vi|.
Suppose that each node in the network starts out with some private information (an opinion,
a vote, a measurement, etc.). We will model each piece of information as a real number, and
denote node i’s initial information as xi[0]. Further suppose that the network is synchronous and
at each time-step t ∈ N, each node updates its information based on its interactions with its
neighbors. We will model these updates as
xi[t+ 1] = fi({xj[t]}), j ∈ Vi ∪ {i},
where fi(·) can be an arbitrary function (and perhaps different for each node, depending on its
role in the network). We assume that each fi(·) is specified a priori for each node i in order
to achieve some pre-specified global objective. However, we also allow for the possibility that
certain nodes in the network do not follow their prescribed strategy. We will use the following
definitions in this paper.
Definition 1: A node i is said to be normal if it applies fi(·) at every time-step t, and it is
called malicious otherwise. Denote the set of malicious nodes by M, and the set of normal
nodes by N = V \M.
Note that comparing with the Byzantine fault model [16], the fault model considered here
does not allow the malicious (or normal) nodes to transmit different values at each time step
(i.e., every pair of nodes will receive the same values from their common neighbors at each
time step). This assumption is natural in many network realizations (such as wireless networks),
and the above definition allows the malicious nodes to behave in an arbitrary manner under this
communication modality. However, we will also show that many of the results in this paper also
apply to the Byzantine fault model (where a Byzantine mode can send arbitrary and different
values to different neighbors at each time-step).
Clearly, there is no hope of achieving any objective if every node in the network is malicious.
Instead, it is reasonable to consider the resilience of the network to various specific classes of
malicious nodes. For instance, a common assumption in the literature on fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms is that the total number of malicious nodes in the network is upper bounded by some
number f [8], [6], [13], i.e., the f -total malicious model. In very large networks, however, it
may be the case that the total number of failures or adversaries is quite large. To capture this,
we will consider in this paper a locally bounded fault model, taken from [17], [15].
Definition 2 (f -local set): A set S ⊂ V is f -local if it contains at most f nodes in the
neighborhood of the other nodes, i.e., |Vi
⋂
S| ≤ f , ∀i ∈ V \ S.
Definition 3 (f -local malicious model): A set M of malicious nodes is f -locally bounded if
it is a f -local set.
Note that the f -total malicious model can be regarded as a special case of the f -local malicious
model. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on two specific algorithms, (i) distributed consensus,
and (ii) broadcast, and derive topological conditions that guarantee resilience to locally bounded
adversaries.
III. ASYMPTOTIC CONSENSUS WITH LOCALLY BOUNDED ADVERSARIES
The use of linear iterative strategies for facilitating distributed consensus has attracted signif-
icant attention in the control community (see [9] and references therein). In such strategies, at
each time-step t ∈ N, each node communicates with its neighbors and updates its local value as
xi[t+ 1] = wii[t]xi[t] +
∑
j∈Vi
wij[t]xj [t],
where wij [t] is the weight assigned to node j’s value by node i at time-step t.
Definition 4 (Asymptotic Consensus): The system is said to reach asymptotic consensus if
|xi[t]− xj [t]| → 0 as t→∞, for all i, j ∈ V .
Various conditions have been provided in the literature that will guarantee that all nodes in
the network reach asymptotic consensus [18], [19], [20], [11], [10] (we will discuss some of
these results in greater detail later in this paper). It is typical in these existing works to assume
the following conditions for the weights.
Assumption 1: There exists a real-valued constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that
• wii[t] ≥ α, ∀i, t
• wij[t] = 0 if j 6∈ Vi, ∀i, j, t
• wij[t] ≥ α if j ∈ Vi, ∀i, j, t
•
∑n
j=1wij[t] = 1, ∀i, t.
The lower bound on the weights is imposed to guarantee convergence; there are various
examples of graphs and updates with no lower bounds for which consensus does not occur [21].
Here, we are interested in the case where not all nodes in the network apply the above linear
iterative strategy. Instead, these malicious nodes can update their values in arbitrary ways to
prevent or bias the consensus value in the network. We now review some recent results pertaining
to this scenario.
A. Previous Results on Resilience of Asymptotic Consensus
The paper [11] studied the use of linear iterative strategies as a mechanism for achieving
flocking behavior in multi-agent systems. They showed that if a ‘leader’ node in the network
does not update its value at each time-step (i.e., it maintains a constant value), then the above
linear iterative strategy (where every other node updates its value to be a convex combination
of its neighborhood values) will cause all nodes to asymptotically converge to the value of the
leader. While this may be acceptable behavior when the network has a legitimate leader, it also
seems to indicate that a simple asymptotic consensus scheme can be easily disrupted by just a
single malicious node. A similar analysis was done in [22], where it was argued that since the
asymptotic consensus scheme can be disrupted by a single node that maintains a constant value,
it can also be disrupted by a single node that updates its values arbitrarily (since maintaining
a constant value is a special case of arbitrary updates). Both of these works only considered a
straightforward application of the linear iteration for asymptotic consensus, without having the
normal nodes perform any operations to avoid the influence of malicious behavior.
In [13], the authors provided a comprehensive analysis of linear iterative strategies in the
presence of malicious nodes. They demonstrated that linear iterative strategies are able to achieve
the minimum bound required to disseminate information reliably; specifically, when a network
is 2f +1 connected, f malicious nodes will be unable to prevent any node from calculating any
function of the initial values (under the broadcast model of communication). This result was
extended in [14] to analyze linear iterative strategies for asymptotic consensus in the presence of
faulty agents (in addition to malicious agents), and [23] studied the problem of detecting attacks
in networks of linear continuous-time systems. While these results require minimal connectivity,
they also require each normal node to have full knowledge of the network topology, along with
strong computational and storage capabilities. The paper [24] considers the problem of reducing
the influence of external intruders on asymptotic consensus in tree networks. They propose a
rewiring scheme whereby each node changes its parent node in an effort to slow down the effect
of externally connected adversaries. While the approach presented in that paper is distributed, it
only applies to tree topologies and requires that the location and intention of the adversaries to
be known by the nodes.
In [16], the authors introduced the Approximate Byzantine Consensus problem, in which
the normal nodes are required to achieve approximate agreement (i.e., they should converge
to a relatively small convex hull contained in their initial values) in the presence of the f -
total Byzantine faults in finite time.1 To solve this problem in complete networks (where there
is a direct connection between every pair of nodes), they proposed the following algorithm:
each node disregards the largest and smallest f nodes in the network and updates its state
to be the average of a carefully chosen subset of the remaining values. They proved that the
algorithm achieves approximate agreement in synchronous and asynchronous networks if there
are more than 3f and 5f nodes in the network, respectively, and provided a provable convergence
rate for both networks. The algorithm was extended to be a family of algorithms, named the
Mean-Subsequence-Reduced or MSR algorithms, in [25]. Although the research on Approximate
1If the network is synchronous, and if one allow t → ∞, then approximate agreement is equivalent to the asymptotic consensus
problem considered in this paper.
Byzantine Consensus for complete networks is mature, there are only a few papers that study
this problem in general network topologies [26], [27], [28]; furthermore, these works have only
provided conditions for local convergence (convergence of a subset of nodes) [26], [28], or for
global convergence in special network topologies [27].
The recent paper [29] proposes a continuous-time variation of the MSR algorithms, named the
Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P), to solve asymptotic consensus under the f -
total malicious model. The authors show that the limit of the state trajectory of each normal node
exists and in complete networks, the normal nodes asymptotically reach consensus on a value
that is in the interval formed by their initial states. In [30], the authors extend the results from
[29] to slightly more general networks and provide sufficient conditions in terms of traditional
graph metrics, such as the in-degree and out-degree of nodes in the network. However, we will
show in this paper that these traditional metrics (such as degree and connectivity) studied in [8],
[13], [29], [30] are no longer the key factors that determine the efficacy of algorithms that make
purely local filtering decisions. Instead, we develop a novel topological condition for general
networks, termed r-robustness, which we show to be much more fundamental in characterizing
the behavior of algorithms such as MSR (including ARC-P) and fault-tolerant broadcast.
B. Description of the Algorithm
We consider the network G = {V, E}, where at each time-step, each node i receives the values
of the nodes in Vi. Node i does not know which, if any, nodes in its neighborhood are malicious;
it only knows that there are at most f malicious nodes. In order to limit the influence of any
malicious nodes, each normal node disregards the most extreme values from its neighborhood at
each time-step, and uses the remaining values in its linear update. More formally, we extend the
MSR algorithm to be the Weighted-Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (W-MSR) algorithm as follows.
1) At each time-step t, each normal node i receives values from all of its neighbors, and
ranks them from largest to smallest.
2) If there are f or more values larger than xi[t], normal node i removes the f largest values.
If there are fewer than f values larger than xi[t], normal node i removes all of these larger
values. This same logic is applied to the smallest values in normal node i’s neighborhood.
Let Ri[t] denote the set of nodes whose values were removed by normal node i at time-step
t.
3) Each normal node i updates its value as
xi[t+ 1] = wii[t]xi[t] +
∑
j∈Vi\Ri[t]
wij[t]xj [t], (1)
where the weights wii[t] and wij[t] satisfy Assumption 1.
Remark 1: Note that the algorithm is the same in time-varying networks, except that Vi is
a function of t. Furthermore, note that the above algorithm essentially falls within the class
of MSR algorithms, with the following generalizations. First, we allow arbitrary time-varying
weights on the edges at each time-step, subject to the constraints listed in Assumption 1. Note
that [31] also proposed an extension of the MSR algorithm which allows convex time-invariant
weights. Second, we allow a node to throw away fewer than 2f values if its own value falls
within the extreme range, thereby allowing it to take full advantage of the available information.
Moreover, we will analyze this algorithm in arbitrary graph topologies (not only fully-connected
ones).
We call the largest number of values that each node could throw away the parameter of the
algorithm (it is equal to 2f in the above algorithm). Note that the set of nodes disregarded by
node i can change over time, depending on their relative values. Thus, even the network topology
itself is fixed, the algorithm effectively mimics a time-varying network. In other words, one can
view this as a consensus algorithm with state-dependent switching.
Remark 2: Consensus algorithms with state-dependent switching have drawn increased atten-
tion in recent years [32], [33]. For example, the following model was introduced in [32] to
capture opinion dynamics in networks:
xi[t+ 1] =
∑
j:|xi[t]−xj [t]|<1
xj [t]
|{j :|xi[t]− xj [t]| < 1}|
.
The constraint |xi[t]− xj [t]| < 1 represents ‘bounded confidence’ among these nodes: an agent
considers one of its neighbors’ opinions as reasonable and accepts it if their opinions differ by
less than 1. There are various differences in the analysis in these previous works in comparison
with this paper. First, the above updating scheme assumes that the underlying graph is complete,
so that each node sees all other nodes and selects only those whose values are close to its own.
Second, there exists a fixed threshold (1 in the above scheme) to represent ‘bounded confidence’,
and this might cause the agents to converge to different clusters for certain choices of initial states
[33]. Most importantly, these previous works on state-dependent connectivity do not consider
the presence of malicious nodes; we posit that the fixed threshold in the update rule still allows a
malicious node to draw all of the other nodes to any desired consensus value, simply by waiting
until all node values have converged sufficiently close together, and then slowly inducing drift
by keeping its value near the edge of the fixed threshold. The algorithm considered in this paper,
on the other hand, applies to general topologies and inherently limits the amount of bias than
can be introduced by any f -local set of malicious nodes.
Note that the W-MSR algorithm is efficient, scalable and fully distributed. The algorithm
needs very limited computation and storage, which is especially important in resource limited
networks. Furthermore, no node needs to know the topology of the network; the only requirement
is that each normal node knows (or assumes) an upper bound of f for the maximum number
of malicious nodes in its neighborhood. Due to this simplicity, it is perhaps unreasonable to
expect that this algorithm will be able to completely eliminate the effects of all malicious nodes.
Instead, as in [29], we will seek to ensure that the algorithm is f -local safe, which we define
below.
Definition 5 (f -local safe): Given the network G, let M be the set of malicious nodes (sat-
isfying the f -local property) and N be the set of normal nodes. The W-MSR algorithm is said
to be f -local safe if all normal nodes asymptotically reach consensus for any choice of initial
values, and the consensus value is in the range [mN [0],MN [0]], where MN [0] and mN [0] denote
the largest and smallest initial values of the normal nodes, respectively.
Note that the above definition does not say that the malicious nodes will have no influence on
the final consensus value. It only says that a f -local set of malicious nodes should not be able
to bias the consensus value to be something outside the range of normal initial values. There are
various practical applications where this is useful. For instance, consider a large sensor network
where every sensor takes a measurement of its environment, captured as a real number. Suppose
that at the time of measurement, all values taken by correct sensors fall within a range [a, b],
and that all sensors are required to come to an agreement on a common measurement value. If
the range of measurements taken by the normal sensors is relatively small, it will likely be the
case that reaching agreement on a value within that range will form a reasonable estimate of the
measurements taken by all sensors. However, if a set of malicious nodes is capable of biasing
the consensus value to be outside this range, the functioning of the network could be severely
disrupted.
Remark 3: Note that our concept of f -local safe holds even if a f -local set of malicious nodes
change their initial values; no matter what these malicious nodes change their value to be, if
the algorithm achieves consensus, it will be on a value that is in the range of the initial values
of the normal nodes.
C. Analysis of the Algorithm
Denote the maximum and minimum values of a set S of nodes at time step t as MS [t] and
mS [t], respectively, i.e., MS [t] = max{xi[t] | i ∈ S} and mS [t] = min{xi[t] | i ∈ S}. Further
denote Φ[t] = MN [t] −mN [t]. Note that Φ[t] → 0 as t → ∞ if and only if the normal nodes
reach asymptotic consensus.
Lemma 1: Under the f -local malicious model, if the normal nodes reach consensus, the W-
MSR algorithm is f -local safe.
Proof: At each time-step t ∈ N, after receiving values from its neighbors, each normal node
throws away at most f largest and f smallest values. Since there are at most f malicious nodes in
the neighborhood of any normal node, the remaining values must be in the range [mN [t],MN [t]];
if all of the malicious nodes were removed, then only the normal nodes are left, and if some
malicious nodes’ values are adopted, then the malicious nodes must have had values inside the
range of the normal values. Since the update (1) is a convex combination of these values, we
have xi[t + 1] ∈ [mN [t],MN [t]] for all t (showing that mN [t] is nondecreasing and MN [t] is
non-increasing). If all normal nodes reach consensus, it must be that Φ[t] → 0, indicating that
x[t] → mN [t] (or MN [t]), and thus the result follows by virtue of the fact that these quantities
are monotonic.
The task now is to provide conditions under which the normal nodes reach consensus, despite
the (arbitrary) actions of the malicious nodes. Recall that when there are up to f malicious nodes
in the entire network, and each normal node knows the entire network topology (along with the
weights used by all other nodes), a network connectivity of 2f +1 is necessary and sufficient to
overcome the malicious nodes [13]. The first question that comes to mind is thus: what does the
connectivity of the network have to say about the ability of the algorithm to facilitate consensus?
Unfortunately, the following result shows that there exist graphs with large connectivity, but that
fail to reach consensus under this algorithm.
Proposition 1: There exists a network with connectivity κ = ⌊n
2
⌋+ f − 1 that cannot achieve
asymptotic consensus using the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f .
Proof: Construct an undirected graph as follows. Take two fully-connected graphs of ⌊n
2
⌋ and
⌈n
2
⌉ nodes, respectively, and call these sets A and B. Number nodes in A and B as a1, a2, . . . , a⌊n
2
⌋
and b1, b2, . . . , b⌈n
2
⌉, respectively. When n is even (singular), for any node ai ∈ A, if i ≤
|B| − f + 1 (|B| − f + 2), connect ai with nodes bi, bi+1, . . . , bi+f−1; otherwise, connect ai with
nodes bi, . . . , b⌈n
2
⌉ and nodes b1, . . . , bi+f−⌈n
2
⌉−1. Form similar connections for nodes in B. Then
each node in A has exactly f neighbors in B, each node in B has at most f neighbors in set A.
Next we will prove that the connectivity of this graph is ⌊n
2
⌋ + f − 1. Let C = {CA, CB}
be a vertex cut, where CA = C ∩ A and CB = C ∩ B. Without loss of generality, assume
that CA = {a1, a2, . . . , a|CA|}; other ways of choosing CA are equivalent to this situation by
renumbering the nodes. By the definition of a vertex cut, we know |CA| > f ; otherwise, each
node in B \ CB still has at least one neighbor in A, and since A \ CA and B \ CB each induce
fully-connected subgraphs, we see that the graph will be connected (contradicting the fact that C
is a vertex cut). When f < |CA|< ⌊n2⌋, the remaining nodes of A still have k = ⌊n2 ⌋−|CA|+f−1
neighbors in B, which implies we need to remove at least k nodes from B to disconnect the
graph. When CA = A, since B is complete, we know |CB| = ⌈n2 ⌉ − 1. Thus the connectivity of
this graph is ⌊n
2
⌋+ f − 1.
In this graph, assume that all nodes in A have initial value c1, and all nodes in B have initial
value c2, where c1 < c2. When any node ai applies the W-MSR algorithm, all of its f neighbors
in B have the highest values in ai’s neighborhood, and thus they are all disregarded. Similarly,
all of bi’s neighbors in A are all disregarded as well. Thus, each node in each set only uses the
values from its own set, and no node ever changes its value, which shows that consensus will
never be reached in this network.
Note that the above network also has minimum degree ⌊n
2
⌋ + f − 1. Thus, even networks
with a large degree or connectivity are not sufficient to guarantee that the normal nodes will
reach consensus, indicating that these metrics are not particularly useful on their own to analyze
the performance of this algorithm. In the next section, we define a topological notion that we
term robustness, and show that this notion more readily characterizes the situations where the
algorithm is f
IV. ROBUST GRAPHS
Taking a closer look at the graph constructed in Proposition 1, we see that the reason for
the failure of consensus in this case is that no node has enough neighbors in the opposite set;
this causes each node to throw away all useful information from the opposite set, and prevents
consensus. Based on this intuition, we define the following property of a set of nodes, which we
will show to be key to characterizing the behavior of local filtering algorithms such as W-MSR.
Definition 6 (r-reachable set): For a graph G and a subset S of nodes of G, we say S is an
r-reachable set if ∃i ∈ S such that |Vi \ S| ≥ r, where r ∈ N+.
In words, a set S is r-reachable if it contains a node that has at least r neighbors outside.
The following lemma follows directly from the definition of an r-reachable set.
Lemma 2: Consider a graph G = {V, E}, and suppose that S ⊂ V is an r-reachable set of
nodes. Then,
• S is r′-reachable for any r satisfying 1≤ r′ ≤ r.
• If we remove up to K incoming edges of each node i ∈ V , where K < r, then S is
(r −K)-reachable.
Definition 7 (r-robust graph): A graph G is r-robust if for every pair of nonempty, disjoint
subsets of V , at least one of the subsets is r-reachable.
Based on these definitions, we obtain the following properties of r-robust graphs.
Lemma 3: For an r-robust graph G, let G ′ be the graph produced by removing up to K
incoming edges of each node in G (K < r). Then G ′ is (r −K)-robust.
Proof: First note that the minimum degree of an r-robust graph must be at least r; otherwise,
if there is a node i with degree less than r, then by taking the two subsets {i} and V \ {i},
we see that neither subset would have a node with r neighbors outside. Thus, it is possible to
remove K incoming edges from every node. We can now apply the second property in Lemma 2
to obtain the desired result.
Lemma 4: If G is r-robust for some r ≥ 1, then it has a spanning tree.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that a 1-robust graph has a spanning tree. Consider the 1-robust
graph G. We will prove that this graph has a spanning tree by contradiction: assume that G does
not have a spanning tree. Decompose the graph into its strongly connected components, and note
that since the graph does not have a spanning tree, there must be at least two components that
have no incoming edges from any other components. However, this contradicts the assumption
that G is 1-robust (at least one of the two subsets must have a neighbor outside the set), so it
must be true that there exists a spanning tree.
When r = 1, the above proof is a more direct version of the proof of Theorem 5 in [20].
A. Consensus With Locally Bounded Faults
In this subsection, we will explore sufficient and necessary conditions under which the algo-
rithm is f -local safe. We first define some notation.
Denote the set of normal nodes with maximum and minimum values at time step t as SNmax[t]
and SNmin[t], respectively, i.e. SNmax[t] = {i | xi[t] = MN [t], i ∈ N} and SNmin[t] = {i | xi[t] =
mN [t], i ∈ N}.
Definition 8: For a network G, define the normal network of G, denoted by GN , as the network
induced by the normal nodes, i.e., GN = {N , EN}, where EN is the set of edges among the
normal nodes.
The following lemma provides a key sufficient condition for the normal nodes to reach
consensus.
Lemma 5: Under the f -local malicious model, the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f is
f -local safe if the normal network GN of the network is (f + 1)-robust.
The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. With the above Lemma in hand, we are now
in place to provide a condition on the original network G that will guarantee that the algorithm
is f -local safe.
Theorem 1: Under the f -local malicious model, the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f is
f -local safe if the network G is (2f + 1)-robust.
Proof: By the definition of the normal network, GN is obtained by removing up to f
incoming edges from each normal node in G. By Lemma 3, if G is (2f + 1)-robust, then GN is
(f + 1)-robust. Finally, by Lemma 5, we get the result.
The following proposition shows that the (2f + 1)-robust condition is tight.
Proposition 2: For every f > 0, there exists a 2f -robust network which fails to reach
consensus using the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f .
Proof: We will prove the result by giving a construction of such a graph, visualized in
Figure 1. In Figure 1, S1, S2 and S3 are all complete components with |S1| = 2f , |S2| = 4f
and |S3| = 2f . Each node in S1 connects to 2f nodes of S2 and each node in S3 connects to
the other 2f nodes of S2, and all these connections are undirected. Node a has incoming edges
from all nodes in S1 and similarly node b has incoming edges from all nodes in S3. This is an
example of a graph that arises from the construction that we derive in Section VI, where we
show that such a graph will be 2f robust. We choose f nodes of S1 and also f nodes of S3 to
be malicious; note that this constitutes an f -local set of malicious nodes. Then we assign node a
with initial value m, node b with initial value M and the other normal nodes with initial values
c, such that m < c < M . Malicious nodes in S1 and S3 will keep their values unchanged at m
and M , respectively. We can see that, by using the W-MSR algorithm, the values of nodes a
and b will never change and thus consensus can not be reached, completing the proof.
f
f
f
f
2f 2fa b
S1 S3
S2
Fig. 1. Illustration of Proposition 2
While the above discussions have been for an underlying time-invariant network G, it is rela-
tively straightforward (albeit notationally tedious) to extend the results to time-varying networks
as follows.
Corollary 1: Let G[t] = {V, E [t]} be a time-varying network with node set V and edge set
at time-step t given by E [t]. Let {tk} be the set of time-steps when G[t] is (2f + 1)-robust.
Under the f -local malicious model, the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f is f -local safe if
|{tk}| =∞ and |tk+1 − tk| ≤ c, ∀k, where c ∈ N+ is some constant.
The proof is similar to Theorem 1, and we omit it here.
Finally, the following result provides a necessary condition for the W-MSR algorithm to be
f -local safe.
Theorem 2: Under the f -local malicious model, the necessary condition for the W-MSR
algorithm with parameter 2f to be f -local safe is that the network G is (f + 1)-robust.
Proof: If the network is not (f + 1)-robust, there exist two disjoint subsets of nodes that
are not (f + 1)-reachable, i.e., each node in these two sets would have at most f neighbors
outside the set. If we assign the maximum and minimum values in the network to these two
sets, respectively, the nodes in these sets would never use any values from outside their own
sets. Thus, their values would remain unchanged, and consensus will not be reached.
Note that the network constructed in Proposition 1 is only f -robust (but not (f + 1)-robust),
since no nodes in sets A or B have f + 1 neighbors outside those sets. Furthermore, it is of
interest to note that the derivations of Theorem 1, Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 did not rely on
the fact that malicious nodes send the same value to all their neighbors. Thus, these results also
apply to the f -local Byzantine model of adversaries.
V. BROADCASTING WITH LOCALLY BOUNDED ADVERSARIES
Having characterized the behavior of the consensus algorithm in terms of the r-robust property
of graphs, we now turn our attention to another important objective in networks: broadcasting
a single value throughout the network. We focus on the following problem, studied in [17],
[15]. Consider a time-invariant communication network G = {V, E}, with a specially designated
source node s ∈ V . The source has a value xs[0] that it wishes to broadcast to every other
node in the network. However, there may be various malicious nodes scattered throughout the
network that wish to prevent certain nodes from obtaining the correct value of the source. The
authors consider the set of malicious nodes to be f -locally bounded. To achieve broadcast (i.e.,
all normal nodes receive the source’s message), [17] proposes the following so-called Certified
Propagation Algorithm (CPA).
1) At time-step 0, the source broadcasts its value to all of its neighbors, and maintains its
value for all subsequent time-steps.
2) At time-step 1, all normal neighbors of the source receive the source’s value and broadcast
it to all of their neighbors. The normal neighbors of the source maintain this value for all
subsequent time-steps.
3) At each time-step t, if a normal node has received an identical value from f+1 neighbors,
then it accepts that value and broadcasts it to all of its neighbors. This normal node keeps
this value for all subsequent time-steps.
Due to the assumption of f -locally bounded malicious nodes, it is easy to see that a normal
node will only ever accept a value if it is the actual value broadcast by the source. For CPA, the
following result from [15] provides a sufficient condition for all normal nodes in the network to
eventually accept the value broadcast by the source.
Theorem 3 ([15]): For a graph G = {V, E} and nodes v, s ∈ V , let X(v, s) denotes the number
of nodes that are in v’s neighborhood and are closer to s than v. Let X(G) = min{X(v, s)|v, s ∈
V, (v, s) /∈ E}. Then CPA succeeds if X(G) > 2f .
This is only a sufficient condition; we will now provide a different sufficient condition for CPA
to succeed, in terms of the robust-graph property that we have defined. We will first introduce
a variation of the concept of an r-robust graph.
Definition 9 (strongly r-robust graph): For a positive integer r, graph G = {V, E} is strongly
r-robust if for any nonempty subset S ⊆ V , either S is r-reachable or there exists a node i ∈ S
such that V \ S ⊆ Vi.
Note that the difference between a strongly r-robust graph and the standard r-robust graph
is that the former requires every subset of nodes to be either r-reachable, or have a node that
connects to every node outside the set, whereas the latter only requires that one of any two sets
satisfies the property of being r-reachable. Any strongly r-robust graph is r-robust, but not vice
versa.
Theorem 4: Under the f -local malicious model, CPA succeeds for any source if the network
is strongly (2f + 1)-robust.
Proof: All normal neighbors of the source receive the message directly, and thus they all
accept it. We will use contradiction to prove that all other nodes receive the broadcast message.
Suppose that CPA fails to deliver the message to all normal nodes, and let S denote the set of
all such normal nodes. By the definition of a strongly (2f +1)-robust graph, we know that some
node i in S must have 2f+1 neighbors outside S or connects to all nodes outside. For the former
situation, at most f of these nodes can be malicious, and all other nodes are normal nodes that
have received the message and re-broadcasted it; for the latter, this node would directly connect
to the source and thus get the message. In either case, this contradicts the assumption that node
i would fail to get the message, and thus the algorithm achieves broadcast.
Note that if the condition of either Theorem 3 or Theorem 4 is satisfied, CPA will also succeed
under the f -local Byzantine model. Finally, the following Proposition shows that CPA succeeds
in certain networks which do not satisfy the condition proposed in Theorem 3.
Proposition 3: For some f , there exist graphs with X(G) ≤ 2f but that are strongly (2f+1)-
robust.
Proof: For f = 1, construct an undirected graph G as follows. Start with a fully-connected
graph of five nodes, denoted as 1, 2, . . . , 5 in turns. Add two nodes 6 and 7 and connect them
to nodes 2, 3, 4 and 3, 4, 5 respectively. Finally, add a node 8 and connect it to nodes 3, 4, 6, 7.
If we take node 1 as the source, it’s easy to check that in the neighborhood of node 8, there
are only two nodes that are closer to the source. Thus X(G) ≤ 2f here, but the graph is still
strongly (2f + 1)-robust, and CPA will succeed.
VI. CONSTRUCTING AN r-ROBUST GRAPH
Note that the concept of an r-robust graph requires that every possible subset of nodes in the
graph satisfies the property of being r-reachable. Currently, we do not have a computationally
efficient method to check whether this property holds for an arbitrary graph. In this section,
however, we describe how to construct r-robust graphs, and show that our construction contains
the preferential-attachment model of scale-free networks as a special case [34].
Theorem 5: Let G = {V, E} be an r-robust graph. Then graph G ′ = {{V, vnew}, {E , Enew}},
where vnew is a new vertex added to G and Enew is the edge set related to vnew, is r-robust if
degvnew ≥ r.
Proof: When we take a pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of nodes from G ′, there are two
cases. If one of the subsets contains only vnew, then this subset is r-reachable (since vnew has r
neighbors in G ′). If both of the subsets contain nodes from the original graph G, then at least one
of the two sets is r-reachable, because these two sets (minus vnew) exist in the original r-robust
graph G, and thus one of the sets has a node that has at least r neighbors outside. Thus, G ′ is
r-robust.
The above theorem indicates that to build an r-robust graph with n nodes (where n ≥ r),
we can start with an r-robust graph of order less than n (such as some complete graph), and
continually add new nodes with incoming edges from at least r nodes in the existing graph. The
theorem does not specify which existing nodes should be chosen as neighbors. A particularly
interesting case is when the nodes are selected with a probability proportional to the number of
edges that they already have; this is known as preferential-attachment, and leads to the formation
of so-called scale-free networks [34]. This mechanism is cited as a plausible mechanism for
the formation of many real-world complex networks, and thus our analysis indicates that these
networks will also be resilient to locally-bounded malicious nodes (provided that r is sufficiently
large when the network is forming).
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have studied the problem of disseminating information in networks that contain malicious
nodes, and where each normal node has no knowledge of the global topology of the network.
We showed that the classical notions of connectivity and minimum degree are not particularly
useful in characterizing the behavior of a class of algorithms that relies on purely local filtering
rules. We then introduced the notion of an r-robust graph, and showed that this concept allows
us to provide conditions for achieving the objectives of distributed consensus and fault-tolerant
broadcast, without requiring any knowledge of the graph topology on the part of the nodes in
the network.
For distributed consensus, variations and extensions of the approach used in this paper have
recently appeared in [35] (for the f -total model of malicious, but non-Byzantine, behavior), and
in [36] (for the f -total model of Byzantine behavior). The sufficient and necessary conditions
proposed in [36] for the MSR algorithms to achieve consensus also apply for the f -local
Byzantine model; however, the proof of the necessary condition in [36] does not apply for
the f -local malicious model (which is the scenario considered in this paper), and thus obtaining
a single necessary and sufficient condition for consensus under this model is an open problem. It
is also of interest to note that the notion of an r-reachable set is similar to the notion of ‘clusters’,
which are topological structures identified in [3] as being impediments to information cascades
in networks. While the topic of information cascades is closely tied to the problems that we
consider in this paper, the presence of malicious nodes in our setup significantly complicates the
analysis. Nevertheless, a closer connection to the results in those works is the subject of ongoing
research. Finally, it will be of interest to relate the r-robust property defined in this paper to
other recent characterizations of network topologies that facilitate fault-tolerant broadcast [37].
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APPENDIX
Lemma 5: Recall that N is the set of normal nodes, and define N = |N |. Let aM [t] and
am[t] denote the maximum and minimum value of the normal nodes at time-step t, respectively.
From Lemma 1, we know that both aM [t] and am[t] are monotone and bounded functions of
t and thus each of them has some limit, denoted by AM and Am, respectively. Note that if
AM = Am, the normal nodes will reach consensus. We will now prove by contradiction that this
must be the case.
Suppose that AM 6= Am (note that AM > Am by definition). We can then define some constant
ǫ0 > 0 such that AM − ǫ0 > Am+ ǫ0. At any time-step t and for any positive real number ǫi, let
XM(t, ǫi) denote the set of all normal nodes that have values in the range (AM−ǫi, AM+ǫi), and
let Xm(t, ǫi) denote the set of all normal nodes that have values in the range (Am− ǫi, Am+ ǫi).
Note that XM(t, ǫ0) and Xm(t, ǫ0) are disjoint, by the definition of ǫ0.
For some ǫ (which we will show how to choose later) satisfying ǫ0 > ǫ > 0, let tǫ be such that
aM [t] < AM + ǫ and am[t] > Am − ǫ, ∀t ≥ tǫ (we know that such a tǫ exists by the definition
of convergence). Consider the disjoint sets XM (tǫ, ǫ0) and Xm(tǫ, ǫ0). At least one of these two
sets must be (f +1)-reachable in GN due to the assumption of (f +1)-robustness. If XM(tǫ, ǫ0)
is (f + 1)-reachable, there exists some node xi ∈ XM(tǫ, ǫ0) that has at least f + 1 normal
neighbors outside XM(tǫ, ǫ0). By definition, all of these neighbors have values at most equal to
AM − ǫ0, and at least one of these values will be used by xi (since xi removes at most f values
lower than its own value). Note that at each time step, every normal node’s value is a convex
combination of its own value and the values it uses from its neighbors, and each coefficient in
the combination is lower bounded by α. Since the largest value that xi will use at time-step
tǫ is aM [tǫ], placing the largest possible weight on aM [tǫ] initiates the following sequence of
inequalities.
xi[tǫ + 1] ≤ (1− α)aM [tǫ] + α(AM − ǫ0)
≤ (1− α)(AM + ǫ) + α(AM − ǫ0)
≤ AM − αǫ0 + (1− α)ǫ.
Note that this upper bound also applies to the updated value of any normal node that is not in
XM(tǫ, ǫ0), because such a node will use its own value in its update. Similarly, if Xm(tǫ, ǫ0) is
(f + 1)-reachable, there exists some node xj ∈ Xm(tǫ, ǫ0) that will satisfy
xj [tǫ + 1] ≥ Am + αǫ0 − (1− α)ǫ.
Again, any normal node that is not in Xm(tǫ, ǫ0) will have the same lower bound. Define
ǫ1 = αǫ0 − (1− α)ǫ,
and consider the sets XM(tǫ+1, ǫ1) and Xm(tǫ+1, ǫ1). Since at least one of the sets XM(tǫ, ǫ0)
and Xm(tǫ, ǫ0) was (f + 1)-reachable, it must be that either |XM(tǫ + 1, ǫ1)| < |XM(tǫ, ǫ0)| or
|Xm(tǫ + 1, ǫ1)| < |Xm(tǫ, ǫ0)|, or both. Further note that ǫ1 < ǫ0, and thus XM(tǫ + 1, ǫ1) and
Xm(tǫ + 1, ǫ1) are still disjoint.
We can repeat this analysis for time-steps tǫ + j, j ≥ 2, to define sets XM(tǫ + j, ǫj) and
Xm(tǫ+j, ǫj), where ǫj is defined recursively as ǫj = αǫj−1−(1−α)ǫ. Furthermore, at time-step
tǫ+ j, either |XM(tǫ+ j, ǫj)| < |XM(tǫ+ j−1, ǫj−1)| or |Xm(tǫ+ j, ǫj)| < |Xm(tǫ+ j−1, ǫj−1)|,
or both. Since |XM(tǫ, ǫ0)| + |Xm(tǫ, ǫ0)| ≤ N , there must be some time-step tǫ + T (where
T ≤ N) where either XM(tǫ + T, ǫT ) or Xm(tǫ + T, ǫT ) is empty. In the former case, all nodes
in the network at time-step tǫ + T have value less than AM − ǫT , and in the latter case all
nodes in the network at time-step tǫ + T have value greater than Am + ǫT . We will show that
ǫT > 0, which will contradict the fact that the largest value monotonically converges to AM (in
the former case) or that the smallest value monotonically converges to Am (in the latter case).
To do this, note that
ǫT = αǫT−1 − (1− α)ǫ
= α2ǫT−2 − α(1− α)ǫ− (1− α)ǫ
.
.
.
= αT ǫ0 − (1− α)(1 + α + · · ·+ α
T−1)ǫ
= αT ǫ0 − (1− α
T )ǫ
≥ αNǫ0 − (1− α
N)ǫ.
If we choose ǫ < αN
1−αN ǫ0, we obtain ǫT > 0, providing the desired contradiction. It must thus
be the case that ǫ0 = 0, proving that AM = Am.
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